Audit Microsoft Entra ID identity settings to uncover weak authentication policies, excessive administrator privileges, inactive accounts, and guest access risks. Review conditional access rules and sign-in logs, then organize findings into a prioritized security report.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Auditing Microsoft Entra ID (Azure Active Directory) configuration to identify risky authentication policies, overly permissive role assignments, stale accounts, conditional access gaps, and guest user risks using AzureAD PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and ScoutSuite.
实测评分 未实测
查看安装方法安装前可以查看交给 AI 代理的指令内容。
Do not use for on-premises Active Directory auditing (use PingCastle or BloodHound AD), for Azure resource-level RBAC auditing without identity context, or for real-time threat detection (use Microsoft Defender for Identity).
Install-Module Microsoft.Graph)az login --tenant TENANT_ID)Assess the tenant's baseline identity security settings including security defaults and legacy authentication status.
# Connect to Microsoft Graph
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Directory.Read.All","Policy.Read.All","AuditLog.Read.All"
# Get tenant details
Get-MgOrganization | Select-Object DisplayName, Id, VerifiedDomains
# Check if Security Defaults are enabled
Get-MgPolicyIdentitySecurityDefaultEnforcementPolicy | Select-Object IsEnabled
# List authentication methods policies
Get-MgPolicyAuthenticationMethodPolicy | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5
# Check legacy authentication status via Conditional Access
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object {
$_.Conditions.ClientAppTypes -contains "exchangeActiveSync" -or
$_.Conditions.ClientAppTypes -contains "other"
} | Select-Object DisplayName, State
Review directory role assignments to identify over-privileged users, permanent admin accounts, and risky role configurations.
# List all Global Administrator assignments
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles/filterByIds" \
--body '{"ids":["62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10"]}' | \
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directoryRoles?filter=displayName eq 'Global Administrator'" \
--query "value[0].id" -o tsv
# List all privileged role assignments using Graph API
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments?\$expand=principal" \
--query "value[*].{Role:roleDefinitionId, Principal:principal.displayName, PrincipalType:principal.@odata.type}" \
-o table
# Check for users with multiple admin roles
az ad user list --query "[].{UPN:userPrincipalName, DisplayName:displayName}" -o table
# List service principals with admin role assignments
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments?\$filter=principalOrganizationId eq 'TENANT_ID'" \
-o json
Audit conditional access policies for coverage gaps, particularly around MFA enforcement, device compliance, and location-based restrictions.
# List all Conditional Access policies
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Select-Object DisplayName, State, @{
N='GrantControls'; E={$_.GrantControls.BuiltInControls -join ', '}
} | Format-Table -AutoSize
# Identify policies in report-only mode (not enforced)
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object {$_.State -eq "enabledForReportingButNotEnforced"} |
Select-Object DisplayName
# Check MFA enforcement coverage
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object {
$_.GrantControls.BuiltInControls -contains "mfa"
} | Select-Object DisplayName, State, @{
N='Users'; E={$_.Conditions.Users.IncludeUsers -join ', '}
}
# Find policies that exclude groups (potential bypass)
Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy | Where-Object {
$_.Conditions.Users.ExcludeGroups.Count -gt 0
} | Select-Object DisplayName, @{
N='ExcludedGroups'; E={$_.Conditions.Users.ExcludeGroups -join ', '}
}
Find accounts that have not signed in recently, disabled accounts with active role assignments, and risky guest user configurations.
# Find users who haven't signed in for 90+ days
az ad user list --query "[?signInActivity.lastSignInDateTime < '2025-11-25T00:00:00Z'].{UPN:userPrincipalName, LastSignIn:signInActivity.lastSignInDateTime, Enabled:accountEnabled}" -o table
# List all guest users
az ad user list --filter "userType eq 'Guest'" \
--query "[].{UPN:userPrincipalName, DisplayName:displayName, CreatedDate:createdDateTime}" \
-o table
# Find guest users with privileged roles
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments?\$expand=principal" \
--query "value[?principal.userType=='Guest'].{Role:roleDefinitionId,Guest:principal.userPrincipalName}" \
-o table
# Check for accounts with disabled MFA
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/reports/authenticationMethods/userRegistrationDetails" \
--query "value[?!isMfaRegistered].{UPN:userPrincipalName,MfaRegistered:isMfaRegistered}" \
-o table
Review sign-in logs to identify anomalous authentication patterns, failed MFA challenges, and risky sign-in detections.
# Get risky sign-ins from last 7 days
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=riskLevelDuringSignIn ne 'none' and createdDateTime ge 2026-02-16T00:00:00Z" \
--query "value[*].{User:userPrincipalName,Risk:riskLevelDuringSignIn,IP:ipAddress,App:appDisplayName,Status:status.errorCode}" \
-o table
# Get sign-ins from unfamiliar locations
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=riskEventTypes_v2/any(r:r eq 'unfamiliarFeatures')" \
--query "value[*].{User:userPrincipalName,Location:location.city,IP:ipAddress}" \
-o table
# Check for legacy authentication sign-ins
az rest --method GET \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=clientAppUsed ne 'Browser' and clientAppUsed ne 'Mobile Apps and Desktop clients'" \
--query "value[*].{User:userPrincipalName,ClientApp:clientAppUsed,Status:status.errorCode}" \
-o table
Execute ScoutSuite for comprehensive automated checks across the Azure tenant configuration.
# Run ScoutSuite against Azure
python3 -m ScoutSuite azure --cli \
--report-dir ./scoutsuite-azure-report \
--all-subscriptions
# Review the generated HTML report
open ./scoutsuite-azure-report/azure-report.html
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Microsoft Entra ID | Microsoft's cloud identity and access management service, formerly Azure Active Directory, providing authentication and authorization |
| Conditional Access | Policy engine that evaluates signals (user, device, location, risk) to enforce access controls like MFA, device compliance, or block access |
| Security Defaults | Microsoft's baseline identity protection settings that enforce MFA registration, block legacy auth, and protect privileged actions |
| Privileged Identity Management | Azure AD Premium P2 feature enabling just-in-time privileged access with approval workflows and time-bound role activation |
| Legacy Authentication | Older authentication protocols (POP3, IMAP, SMTP, ActiveSync) that do not support MFA and are commonly exploited for credential attacks |
| Risky Sign-In | Microsoft Entra Identity Protection detection of sign-in anomalies including impossible travel, unfamiliar locations, and malware-linked IPs |
Context: After acquiring a company, the security team needs to assess the Azure tenant identity posture before integrating it with the corporate Entra ID.
Approach:
Pitfalls: Azure AD Premium P2 is required for risky sign-in detections and PIM. If the acquired tenant uses a lower license tier, many identity protection features will be unavailable. Guest users from partner tenants may have implicit access through dynamic groups that are not visible in standard role assignment queries.
Azure Active Directory Security Audit Report
===============================================
Tenant: acme-acquired.onmicrosoft.com
Tenant ID: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
Audit Date: 2026-02-23
License: Azure AD Premium P2
IDENTITY CONFIGURATION:
Security Defaults: Disabled (Conditional Access in use)
Conditional Access Policies: 12 (8 enforced, 3 report-only, 1 disabled)
Legacy Auth Blocked: Partial (blocked for admins only)
PRIVILEGED ACCESS:
Global Administrators: 8 (recommended: <= 4)
Permanent admin assignments: 6 (no PIM activation required)
Service principals with admin: 3
Guest users with privileged roles: 2
ACCOUNT HYGIENE:
Total users: 1,247
Stale accounts (90+ days): 89
Guest users: 234
Users without MFA registered: 156
SIGN-IN RISK:
Risky sign-ins (last 30 days): 34
Legacy auth sign-ins (last 7 days): 67
Impossible travel detections: 5
Unfamiliar location sign-ins: 12
CRITICAL FINDINGS:
1. 8 Global Administrators with permanent assignments (use PIM)
2. Legacy authentication not blocked for non-admin users
3. 156 users without MFA registration
4. 2 guest users with Privileged Role Administrator role
还没有评价。欢迎分享你的使用感受。
无需登录即可发表。欢迎分享使用感受、提问，或说明在哪些环境下无法运行。
还没有评论。来写第一条吧。
Assess exposure of Windows secrets protected by DPAPI, the operating system’s data protection service, during authorized security tests. Guide examination and decryption of saved credentials and browser data using available user sessions, credentials, or backup keys.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Assess Shadow Credentials account takeover during authorized Active Directory testing. Examine permissions that allow public key registration, validate authentication without a password reset, and document credential cleanup, detection opportunities, and access control changes needed for remediation.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Prepare for CMMC Level 2, a cybersecurity certification for defense contractors. Define the systems handling controlled information, review security requirements, calculate the SPRS assessment score, and organize remediation plans and evidence into a readiness report.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Create disk images for investigations using dd or dcfldd on Linux. The workflow covers write protection, bit-for-bit copying, hash checks to verify integrity, and documentation of the acquisition process.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Review Active Directory permissions with ldap3, a Python library for directory queries. Identify excessive access granted to non-administrative accounts, explain potential privilege escalation paths, and produce a JSON report with affected objects and remediation recommendations.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。
Inspect suspicious Android APK files without running them. Analyze permissions, app components, suspicious code patterns, and network indicators, then produce a JSON risk report to support malware triage and detection rule development.
中文简介正在准备中。当前显示英语简介。