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detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

Investigate attacks that make legitimate Windows applications load malicious DLL files. This skill examines loading events, digital signatures, file hashes, and unusual locations, then checks process behavior to document suspicious cases and guide remediation.

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Detect DLL side-loading and search-order hijacking (MITRE T1574) where adversaries plant malicious DLLs for legitimate signed applications to load, by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 7 DLL-load events, checking signatures/hashes against known-good versions, and flagging path anomalies with EDR tools like CrowdStrike, MDE, or SentinelOne. Use when investigating EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs, hunting for APT persistence via trojanized applications, or triaging incidents involving DLL hijacking.

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适用场景

  • Investigating alerts about unsigned DLL files
  • Hunting for persistent threats using legitimate applications
  • Checking suspicious DLL loading paths
  • Documenting DLL hijacking incidents

包含的文件(8)

  • SKILL.md4.4 KB
  • assets/template.md695 B
  • LICENSE11.0 KB
  • references/api-reference.md1.5 KB
  • references/standards.md1.9 KB
  • references/workflows.md2.2 KB
  • scripts/agent.py5.7 KB
  • scripts/process.py6.0 KB

SKILL.md(原文)

安装前可以查看交给 AI 代理的指令内容。

Detecting DLL Sideloading Attacks

When to Use

  • When investigating potential DLL hijacking in enterprise environments
  • After EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs loaded by signed applications
  • When hunting for APT persistence using legitimate application wrappers
  • During incident response to identify trojanized applications
  • When threat intel indicates DLL sideloading campaigns targeting specific software

Prerequisites

  • EDR with DLL load monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
  • Sysmon Event ID 7 (Image Loaded) with hash verification
  • Application whitelisting or DLL integrity monitoring
  • Software inventory of legitimate applications and expected DLL paths
  • Code signing verification capabilities

Workflow

  1. Identify Sideloading Targets: Research known vulnerable applications that load DLLs without full path qualification (LOLBAS, DLL-sideload databases).
  2. Monitor DLL Load Events: Query Sysmon Event ID 7 for DLL loads where the DLL path differs from the application's expected directory.
  3. Check DLL Signatures: Flag unsigned or untrusted DLLs loaded by signed executables.
  4. Detect Path Anomalies: Identify legitimate executables running from unusual locations (Temp, AppData, Public) that may be decoy wrappers.
  5. Hash Verification: Compare loaded DLL hashes against known-good versions and threat intel feeds.
  6. Correlate with Process Behavior: Check if the host process exhibits unusual behavior (network connections, child processes) after loading the suspicious DLL.
  7. Document and Remediate: Report sideloading instances, quarantine malicious DLLs, and update detection rules.

Key Concepts

ConceptDescription
T1574.002DLL Side-Loading
T1574.001DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1574.006Dynamic Linker Hijacking
T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
DLL Search OrderWindows DLL loading priority path
Side-LoadingPlacing malicious DLL where legitimate app loads it
Phantom DLLDLL that legitimate apps try to load but does not exist
DLL ProxyingMalicious DLL forwarding calls to legitimate DLL

Tools & Systems

ToolPurpose
SysmonEvent ID 7 DLL load monitoring
CrowdStrike FalconDLL load detection with process context
Microsoft Defender for EndpointDLL load anomaly detection
Process MonitorReal-time DLL load tracing
DLL Export ViewerVerify DLL export functions
SigcheckDigital signature verification
pe-sievePE analysis for proxied DLLs

Common Scenarios

  1. Legitimate App Wrapper: Adversary copies signed application (e.g., OneDrive updater) to temp folder alongside malicious DLL with same name as expected dependency.
  2. Phantom DLL Exploitation: Malicious DLL placed in PATH location where legitimate app searches for non-existent DLL.
  3. DLL Proxy Loading: Malicious version.dll proxies all exports to real version.dll while executing malicious code on DllMain.
  4. Software Update Hijack: Attacker replaces DLL in update staging directory before legitimate updater loads it.

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-SIDELOAD-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1574.002
Host Application: [Legitimate signed executable]
Sideloaded DLL: [Malicious DLL name and path]
Expected DLL Path: [Where DLL should legitimately be]
DLL Signed: [Yes/No]
App Location: [Expected/Anomalous]
Host: [Hostname]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

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