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root-cause-analyzer

Determine the minimal technical root cause of candidate security findings, separate causes from symptoms, cluster duplicates, and identify shared vulnerable abstractions.

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包含的文件(3)

  • SKILL.md3.4 KB
  • references/clustering-rules.md699 B
  • templates/root-cause-analysis.yaml798 B

SKILL.md(原文)

安装前可以查看交给 AI 代理的指令内容。

Root Cause Analyzer

Mission

Reduce noisy findings into defensible root causes. Determine whether multiple observations represent one defect, independent defects, or downstream symptoms. Produce a root-cause signature usable by triage, variant discovery, and report writing.

Core distinction

  • Trigger: attacker action or input.
  • Enabling condition: configuration, timing, authority, or state required.
  • Root cause: earliest incorrect security-relevant assumption, validation, state transition, or invariant enforcement failure.
  • Propagation: how the error flows through the system.
  • Symptom: crash, leak, unauthorized state, incorrect accounting, divergence, or other observable result.
  • Impact: security consequence under a realistic attacker model.

Do not label the symptom as the root cause when an earlier shared defect explains it.

Workflow

1. Normalize candidate findings

Collect code references, traces, PoCs, inputs, observed outputs, configuration, and claimed impact. Mark missing evidence.

2. Build causal chain

Construct:

attacker input/capability
→ validation or assumption
→ first incorrect state/decision
→ propagation
→ observable symptom
→ security impact

Each edge must be supported or marked as inferred.

3. Find earliest invariant violation

Ask:

  • What should have been true here?
  • Where was that invariant first lost?
  • Is the failure local or inherited from a caller/shared abstraction?
  • Would fixing this location prevent all observed symptoms?
  • Would a downstream patch merely hide one manifestation?

4. Cluster candidates

Candidates are likely one root cause when they share:

  • the same missing/incorrect validation;
  • the same unsafe abstraction or helper;
  • the same state-machine transition defect;
  • the same canonicalization mismatch;
  • the same authority/accounting invariant;
  • the same parser or protocol assumption;
  • the same patch location and remediation.

Do not merge findings solely because they share impact, endpoint family, CWE, or affected component.

5. Test patch equivalence

Use the counterfactual:

If the proposed root-cause fix is applied once, which observations disappear?

If one fix removes all, treat them as manifestations unless independent security boundaries justify separate reports.

6. Generate root-cause fingerprint

Fingerprint fields:

  • violated invariant;
  • vulnerable abstraction/symbol;
  • missing or incorrect operation;
  • attacker-controlled dimension;
  • required state/configuration;
  • resulting primitive;
  • likely remediation boundary.

7. Estimate duplicate risk

Assess:

  • same root cause already known internally;
  • same upstream dependency defect;
  • same issue reported through another endpoint;
  • patch/commit history suggesting known behavior;
  • public issue/advisory references supplied by authorized sources.

Never assert duplicate without evidence. Use duplicate_risk, not duplicate, unless confirmed.

Verdicts

  • UNIFIED_ROOT_CAUSE
  • INDEPENDENT_FINDINGS
  • SHARED_PRIMITIVE_DIFFERENT_ROOT_CAUSES
  • SYMPTOM_ONLY_NEEDS_MORE_EVIDENCE
  • NOT_A_SECURITY_ROOT_CAUSE

Output

Use templates/root-cause-analysis.yaml. Send the root-cause fingerprint to Variant Discovery.

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