AI SRE Incident Response
Apply SRE rigor to AI systems where incidents include quality regressions, unsafe outputs, and budget explosions.
When to Use This Skill
- An LLM endpoint begins returning degraded or hallucinated answers
- Token spend spikes beyond budget thresholds
- A model provider goes down and traffic must fail over
- Safety guardrails fire at abnormal rates
- A new model deployment causes latency or accuracy regression
Prerequisites
- Prometheus and Alertmanager deployed with scrape targets for AI services
- Grafana dashboards for golden signals (latency, error rate, cost, quality)
- On-call rotation configured in PagerDuty, Opsgenie, or equivalent
- Runbook repository accessible to responders
- Rollback mechanism for model and prompt versions (GitOps or feature flags)
AI Incident Classes
- Availability incident: model/provider unavailable, timeout storm.
- Quality incident: answer accuracy or tool success drops below SLO.
- Safety incident: harmful or policy-violating outputs increase.
- Cost incident: unexpected token or provider spend spike.
Severity Framework
| Severity | Criteria | Response Time | Notification |
|---|
| SEV1 | User-facing outage, compliance risk, data leak | 5 min | Page on-call + incident commander |
| SEV2 | Major degradation in key flows | 15 min | Page on-call |
| SEV3 | Limited impact or internal-only issue | 1 hour | Slack alert |
| SEV4 | Cosmetic or low-priority regression | Next business day | Ticket |
Golden Signals for AI Services
- Request success rate
- Latency (queue + generation + tool execution)
- Hallucination/groundedness proxy metrics
- Cost per minute and per tenant
- Guardrail violation rate
Prometheus Alert Rules
The thresholds below are illustrative. Calibrate them to the declared SLO, metric units, tenant budgets and workload; a groundedness proxy is not a verified quality measurement. Counter rates are per second, so the cost-per-minute alert explicitly multiplies by 60.
# prometheus-ai-alerts.yaml
groups:
- name: ai-service-alerts
rules:
- alert: ModelEndpointDown
expr: up{job="llm-inference"} == 0
for: 2m
labels:
severity: sev1
annotations:
summary: "LLM inference endpoint {{ $labels.instance }} is down"
runbook_url: "https://runbooks.internal/ai/model-outage"
- alert: HighHallucinationRate
expr: |
rate(llm_hallucination_detected_total[10m])
/ rate(llm_requests_total[10m]) > 0.15
for: 5m
labels:
severity: sev2
annotations:
summary: "Hallucination rate above 15% for {{ $labels.model }}"
runbook_url: "https://runbooks.internal/ai/quality-regression"
- alert: TokenCostExplosion
expr: |
60 * sum(rate(llm_token_cost_dollars[5m])) by (tenant)
> 0.50
for: 3m
labels:
severity: sev2
annotations:
summary: "Token spend exceeds $0.50/min for tenant {{ $labels.tenant }}"
runbook_url: "https://runbooks.internal/ai/cost-spike"
- alert: LatencyP95Exceeded
expr: |
histogram_quantile(0.95,
rate(llm_request_duration_seconds_bucket[5m])
) > 5
for: 5m
labels:
severity: sev2
annotations:
summary: "LLM p95 latency exceeds 5s for {{ $labels.service }}"
- alert: GuardrailViolationSpike
expr: |
rate(llm_guardrail_violations_total[10m])
/ rate(llm_requests_total[10m]) > 0.05
for: 5m
labels:
severity: sev1
annotations:
summary: "Guardrail violations above 5% for {{ $labels.model }}"
runbook_url: "https://runbooks.internal/ai/safety-incident"
- alert: ModelQualityDrop
expr: |
llm_eval_score{metric="groundedness"} < 0.70
for: 10m
labels:
severity: sev2
annotations:
summary: "Groundedness score dropped below 0.70 for {{ $labels.model }}"
- alert: ProviderErrorRateHigh
expr: |
rate(llm_provider_errors_total[5m])
/ rate(llm_provider_requests_total[5m]) > 0.10
for: 3m
labels:
severity: sev2
annotations:
summary: "Provider {{ $labels.provider }} error rate above 10%"
Response Playbooks
Model Outage Runbook
TRIGGER: ModelEndpointDown fires for > 2 minutes
RESPONDER: On-call AI platform engineer
1. Acknowledge alert in PagerDuty.
2. Check provider status page (e.g., status.openai.com).
3. Verify network connectivity:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://api.provider.com/health
4. If provider is down:
a. Enable fallback model route in gateway config.
b. kubectl set env deployment/llm-gateway FALLBACK_ENABLED=true
c. Verify fallback traffic is flowing via Grafana dashboard.
5. If self-hosted model is down:
a. Check pod status: kubectl get pods -l app=llm-inference -n ai
b. Check GPU health: kubectl logs -l app=llm-inference --tail=50
c. Restart if OOM: kubectl rollout restart deployment/llm-inference -n ai
6. Request the existing deployment-freeze mechanism for the exact affected scope.
A Kubernetes annotation by itself does not enforce a freeze; verify that the configured controller/pipeline actually honors it.
7. Communicate ETA in #incident-channel.
8. When resolved, unfreeze and run smoke tests.
Quality Regression Runbook (Hallucination Spike)
TRIGGER: HighHallucinationRate or ModelQualityDrop fires
RESPONDER: On-call AI engineer + ML lead
1. Acknowledge alert. Open incident ticket.
2. Identify scope:
- Which model version? Check deployment metadata.
- Which routes/tenants affected? Filter by labels in Grafana.
3. Check recent changes:
- Model version promotion in last 24h?
- Prompt template changes in last 24h?
- Retrieval index rebuild in last 24h?
4. If recent model change:
kubectl rollout undo deployment/llm-inference -n ai
5. If recent prompt change:
Prepare a reviewed revert on a topic branch, verify it in staging, and use the protected deployment path; do not push a production rollback blindly.
6. If authorized, increase redacted trace sampling for the affected route only after checking personal-data exposure and the remaining storage/cost budget:
kubectl set env deployment/llm-gateway TRACE_SAMPLE_RATE=1.0
7. Run the existing version-bound evaluation suite against an authorized isolated copy of the model/prompt configuration using synthetic or redacted cases.
No run_evals.py helper is bundled; never describe a production call as offline.
8. Confirm metrics return to baseline before closing.
Token Cost Explosion Runbook
TRIGGER: TokenCostExplosion fires
RESPONDER: On-call platform engineer
1. Identify top consumers:
Query: topk(10, sum(rate(llm_token_cost_dollars[15m])) by (tenant, model, route))
2. Check for runaway loops:
- Agent retry storms (exponential token growth per request)
- Missing max_tokens caps on new routes
- Cache bypass due to config change
3. Apply immediate caps:
kubectl patch configmap llm-quotas -n ai --patch '
data:
max_tokens_per_request: "4096"
rpm_limit: "60"
'
4. Review existing cache isolation before any enablement: tenant/user identity, permissions, invalidation and private-content retention must be enforced.
Do not turn on a generic shared semantic cache during an incident.
5. If authorized, route only to an already approved fallback meeting the declared quality, privacy and cost constraints. Review the exact change before updating gateway configuration.
6. Notify affected tenants of temporary limits.
7. Open postmortem with cost attribution analysis.
Escalation Procedures
Level 1 (0-15 min): On-call AI platform engineer
Level 2 (15-30 min): AI platform team lead + affected product owner
Level 3 (30-60 min): Engineering director + security (if safety incident)
Level 4 (60+ min): VP Engineering + legal (if compliance/data incident)
Safety incidents always start at Level 2 minimum.
Provider-side incidents: open support ticket immediately at Level 1.
Detection Queries (PromQL)
# Request success rate by model
1 - (
sum(rate(llm_requests_total{status="error"}[5m])) by (model)
/ sum(rate(llm_requests_total[5m])) by (model)
)
# Cost per successful answer
sum(rate(llm_token_cost_dollars[5m])) by (route)
/ sum(rate(llm_requests_total{status="success"}[5m])) by (route)
# Hallucination rate trend (1h window, 5m steps)
rate(llm_hallucination_detected_total[1h])
/ rate(llm_requests_total[1h])
# Latency breakdown by stage
histogram_quantile(0.95, rate(llm_retrieval_duration_seconds_bucket[5m]))
histogram_quantile(0.95, rate(llm_generation_duration_seconds_bucket[5m]))
histogram_quantile(0.95, rate(llm_tool_execution_duration_seconds_bucket[5m]))
# Tenant cost leaderboard
topk(10, sum(rate(llm_token_cost_dollars[1h])) by (tenant))
Postmortem Requirements
- Timeline with detector and responder timestamps
- Blast radius by tenant and feature
- Missed signals and alert tuning actions
- Concrete hardening tasks with owners and due dates
- Cost impact (dollars, tokens, affected requests)
- Customer communication log
Postmortem Template
## Incident Summary
- **Severity**: SEVx
- **Duration**: start_time - end_time (Xh Ym)
- **Detection**: How was it detected? (alert / customer report / manual)
- **Impact**: X tenants, Y requests, $Z cost
## Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event |
|------------|-------|
| HH:MM | Alert fired |
| HH:MM | Responder acknowledged |
| HH:MM | Root cause identified |
| HH:MM | Mitigation applied |
| HH:MM | Incident resolved |
## Root Cause
[Description]
## Action Items
| Action | Owner | Due Date | Status |
|--------|-------|----------|--------|
| Tune alert threshold | @engineer | YYYY-MM-DD | Open |
| Add fallback route | @platform | YYYY-MM-DD | Open |
Chaos Engineering for AI Systems
Test drills only in a disposable isolated harness or separately authorized staging environment. Use synthetic inputs and a predeclared fault schedule, bounded duration, costs, recovery and notification policy; never deploy a known-bad model or block a real provider in production to create a drill. Regularly test incident readiness:
- Provider failover drill: block provider API at network level, verify fallback activates within SLO.
- Model rollback drill: deploy known-bad model version, verify automated quality gate catches it.
- Cost cap drill: simulate runaway token usage, verify quotas trigger before budget threshold.
- Cache failure drill: disable semantic cache, verify system degrades gracefully.
Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Check | Fix |
|---|
| All requests timing out | Provider status page, DNS resolution | Enable fallback provider |
| Gradual quality decline | Recent model/prompt deployments | Roll back to last known good |
| Sudden cost spike | Per-tenant token usage dashboard | Apply emergency token caps |
| Guardrail violations spike | Model version, prompt injection logs | Enable stricter input filtering |
| Intermittent 503 errors | Pod restarts, GPU OOM events | Increase memory limits or reduce batch size |
Related Skills
- incident-response (
incident-response) - Standard incident process and evidence
- alerting-oncall (
alerting-oncall) - Paging and escalation policy
- llm-cost-optimization (
llm-cost-optimization) - Spend controls and efficiency patterns
- agent-observability (
agent-observability) - Instrument requests, traces, and costs
- rag-observability-evals (
rag-observability-evals) - RAG quality monitoring
Limitations
- Guidance executes against real environments: confirm target, blast radius, and rollback plan before applying anything.
- Never deploy to production without explicit approval. Docs-only import: upstream scripts and templates not bundled.
Example
git status && git diff --stat
kubectl diff -f manifest.yaml
Adapted from BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills (MIT); frontmatter, When to Use/Limitations, and safety boundaries added for upstream compliance. Docs-only import: helper scripts and templates not bundled.