Results for “dcsync”

Support authorized Active Directory assessments of DCSync, which abuses directory replication rights to obtain credential data. Cover replication permission review, Golden Ticket persistence testing, detection validation, and documentation of evidence and remediation recommendations.

• Reviewing accounts with directory replication rights
• Testing DCSync risks in an authorized lab
• Validating detection of replication abuse and forged tickets

Investigate DCSync attacks, which abuse Active Directory replication to steal password hashes. Use audit events and network traffic to identify suspicious replication requests, examine their sources, and check for subsequent credential misuse.

• Hunting for credential theft in Active Directory
• Investigating suspected Mimikatz or Impacket use
• Auditing accounts with directory replication permissions

Exploit Active Directory replication privileges (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) to perform a DCSync attack, allowing an attacker to impersonate a Domain Controller and extract password hashes (like the krbtgt hash for Golden Tickets) without code execution on a DC.

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Execute a DCSync attack mimicking the behavior of a legitimate Active Directory Domain Controller (DC). Leverage Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (DRSR) permissions to silently request and extract the password hashes (NTLM/Kerberos) of any or all users in the domain without executing code on the target Domain Controller.

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Hunts for Active Directory credential and replication attacks — DCSync, Golden/Silver Ticket, and DCShadow — by analyzing directory-service-access (4662), Kerberos TGS (4769), and logon (4624) events for replication abuse and forged-ticket anomalies. Activates for requests to hunt DCSync, detect golden/silver tickets, or find Active Directory replication abuse.

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Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.

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Perform DCSync attacks to replicate Active Directory credentials and establish domain persistence by extracting KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket creation.

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Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.

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Perform DCSync attacks to replicate Active Directory credentials and establish domain persistence by extracting KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket creation.

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Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.

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Perform DCSync attacks to replicate Active Directory credentials and establish domain persistence by extracting KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket creation.

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Investigate signs of Mimikatz credential theft using command lines, access to Windows authentication memory, file indicators, and known modules in memory. Correlate endpoint and security logs to assess suspicious alerts, document evidence, and recommend response actions.

• Investigating alerts about Windows authentication memory access
• Hunting for signs of credential theft
• Assessing compromise scope during incident response

Execute a complete Active Directory penetration test from initial enumeration to domain dominance. Use this skill for AD security assessments including LDAP enumeration, Kerberos attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting), BloodHound attack path analysis, credential dumping with Mimikatz, lateral movement via PsExec/WMI/DCOM, DCSync for NTDS extraction, and Golden/Silver ticket forging. Covers the full kill chain from domain user to domain admin.

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Assess Windows and Active Directory identity security within an authorized scope. Map accounts and permissions, investigate authentication and certificate weaknesses, and document paths that could allow an attacker to gain greater access.

• Mapping Active Directory privilege escalation paths
• Reviewing Kerberos authentication weaknesses
• Testing AD CS certificate configuration weaknesses

Active Directory attack methodology for internal network red team engagements. Covers reconnaissance (BloodHound, PowerView, ADExplorer), credential abuse (Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning), privilege escalation (ACL abuse, GPO abuse, unconstrained/constrained delegation), lateral movement (Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, Overpass-the-Hash, WMI/WinRM/PsExec), persistence (Golden/Silver/Diamond Tickets, DCSync, DCShadow, AdminSDHolder, Skeleton Key), forest trust attacks, ADCS abuse (ESC1-ESC15), and modern MDI/Defender for Identity evasion. Use when assessing on-prem AD, hybrid AD/Entra ID environments, or ADCS deployments.

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This skill should be used when the user asks to "attack Active Directory", "exploit AD", "Kerberoasting", "DCSync", "pass-the-hash", "BloodHound enumeration", "Golden Ticket", "Silver Ticket", "AS-REP roasting", "NTLM relay", or needs guidance on Windows domain penetration testing.

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Active Directory ACL abuse playbook. Use when exploiting misconfigured AD permissions including GenericAll, WriteDACL, DCSync rights, shadow credentials, LAPS reading, GPO abuse, and BloodHound-guided attack paths.

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Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu), ticket forgery & DCSync, dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), BloodHound attack-path enumeration, domain dominance

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Active Directory attack hunting - enumeration to domain dominance. Spray-safe (lockout gate), AS-REP/Kerberoast, ACL + ADCS (ESC1-16), delegation, DCSync, lateral movement. Wiki-first, FIND schema output.

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Local Windows privilege escalation on a STANDALONE / workgroup host, or a local shell on a domain member - foothold to SYSTEM. Token privileges (SeImpersonate/Potato), service misconfig (weak perms / unquoted path / writable binary), registry autologon creds, scheduled-task + writable-script abuse, DLL hijack, AlwaysInstallElevated, UAC bypass, credential loot. For DOMAIN escalation (kerberoast/DCSync/ADCS/BloodHound) use hunt-ad instead. Wiki-first, FIND schema output.

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Abusing Active Directory object ACLs (DACL/ownership) for privilege escalation and lateral movement (GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, AddMember, ForceChangePassword, and replication rights via DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All). Use when BloodHound CE shows an outbound control edge from a principal you own toward a higher-value object, and you want the exact bloodyAD/impacket command to weaponize that ACE, plus detection and remediation. DCSync is covered here strictly as a post-compromise technique, not a user entry path.

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Authentication coercion (PetitPotam MS-EFSR, PrinterBug MS-RPRN, DFSCoerce MS-DFSNM) chained into NTLM relay (impacket ntlmrelayx) toward LDAP, AD CS web enrollment (ESC8), or SMB. Use when SMB signing is not enforced or LDAP channel binding is missing, and you want to force a privileged machine account to authenticate to your relay and turn that into RBCD, a DCSync-capable ACL grant, or a certificate. Includes the exact Coercer/ntlmrelayx commands, requirements, detection, and remediation.

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The telemetry each Active Directory technique generates and what alerts a defender: Kerberoasting produces Event 4769 with RC4 encryption (0x17) and an MDI alert, DCSync produces Event 4662 with the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUID, AS-REP roasting produces Event 4768 with no pre-auth, LSASS dumping is blocked by EDR, plus a lateral-movement telemetry table by protocol (SMB/WMI/WinRM/RDP/DCOM). Use this whenever you run or plan an offensive AD technique and need to know what noise it makes, when writing the engagement's detection notes, or when a defender wants to know what to monitor. Teaches red teamers what is loud and blue teamers what to watch. Standard-tooling knowledge, no vendor engine.

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Active Directory reconnaissance with or without credentials: user/group/computer enumeration, ACL/delegation, ADCS, modern Windows LAPS, BloodHound, Server 2025/dMSA/Ghost SPN candidates, and trust mapping. Recon only — do not exploit Kerberoast-to-DA, DCSync, or change passwords. Operator may select /ad-attack after cards are ready.

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