Use when about to send a request to, scan, enumerate, exploit, or otherwise interact with any host, IP, URL, or asset — before the first packet reaches a target
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See how to installReview the instructions the agent will receive before you install.
The Iron Law: No target without authorization. Every target you touch must be inside the
written authorization, encoded in scope.json. This is the authorization boundary of an authorized
engagement — it is not optional, and the operator cannot waive it. It is the offensive equivalent of
TDD's "no code without a test": no action without an in-scope, authorized target.
Violating the letter of this rule is violating its spirit.
Before touching ANY target, confirm it is in scope:
python skills/coding-mastery/scripts/_lib/scope_guard.py check <target> --scope .engage/scope/scope.json
# exit 0 = in-scope (proceed) | exit 3 = OUT (stop) | exit 2 = error (stop)
For outward actions, gate through action_guard.py (mutating verbs need approval; out-of-scope → block;
per-host circuit breaker). Bash scripts source lib.sh and call _in_scope.
scope.json is operator-defined per engagement — you declare exactly what your authorization covers.
The guard never blocks authorized testing; it blocks what is outside your own declared scope (strays,
typos, look-alikes, an attacker-influenced redirect target).
scope.json → out)*.acme.com so acme.com.evil.com is fine" (look-alike — the guard rejects it; so do you)All of these mean: run scope_guard.py check first. Out-of-scope ⇒ do not proceed.
| Excuse | Reality |
|---|---|
| "Scope is obviously fine" | Confirm against scope.json; assumption is how OOB incidents happen. |
| "It's adjacent infra, basically in scope" | Adjacent ≠ authorized. Out unless declared. |
| "I'll note the out-of-scope hit in the report" | You don't hit it, then note it. You don't hit it. |
| "Removing the guard is faster" | The guard IS the authorization. Removing it = unauthorized attack. |
Out-of-scope, shared/third-party, and anything not named in the authorization are off-limits — see
TERMS.md. You own every request the toolkit sends.
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Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu), ticket forgery & DCSync, dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), BloodHound attack-path enumeration, domain dominance
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Use when red-teaming an agentic AI / LLM application — indirect & zero-click prompt injection, MCP tool poisoning, persistent memory poisoning, excessive-agency tool abuse, multi-turn jailbreaks, PyRIT/Garak/Promptfoo harnesses
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Use when attacking an AI/ML system or model — prompt injection & jailbreaks (Crescendo, Skeleton Key, Best-of-N), RAG/vector poisoning, agentic/MCP exploitation (CVE-2025-54136), ML supply-chain RCE (pickle CVE-2025-32434), model extraction / membership inference / adversarial suffixes (GCG)
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Use when building a client-side browser exploit — V8/JSC JIT type confusion to renderer R/W, V8 heap-sandbox escape, renderer-to-browser sandbox escape (Mojo IPC, GPU/Dawn/ANGLE), Electron/webview IPC abuse, 1-click RCE chains
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Use when attacking or auditing a CI/CD pipeline or software supply chain — pwn requests, poisoned pipeline execution, compromised/mutable-tag actions, dependency confusion, registry worms, runner backdoors, OIDC trust abuse, SLSA/provenance
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Use when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse
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