syft-generation
Overview
Per github.com/anchore/syft, Syft generates SBOMs from "container
images, filesystems, archives" (OCI, Docker, Singularity). The SBOM is the
input artifact for vuln scanning with Grype (Step 7), for SBOM-to-SBOM
drift diffing (Step 8), and for compliance delivery in SPDX or CycloneDX
format.
SBOMs are mandated by US EO 14028 (software sold to federal agencies), the EU
Cyber Resilience Act (products with digital elements, in effect 2024+), and
FDA medical-device guidance; internal supply-chain audits also need a full
dependency manifest.
When to use
- The team ships software to customers requiring an SBOM (federal,
EU regulated, medical device, etc.).
- Internal compliance program requires SBOM as evidence artifact.
- The vuln-scanning workflow needs an SBOM input (Grype, OSV-Scanner
with
--sbom).
- Container-image build pipelines need accompanying SBOM for
delivery alongside the image.
- A rebuilt image needs a dependency-drift check ("what changed in the
inventory?") or a "no unexpected new transitive deps" release gate
(Step 8).
Step 1 - Install
Per sf-gh:
# Homebrew
brew install syft
# Docker
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/scan" anchore/syft scan dir:/scan -o cyclonedx-json
# Install script into a user-owned dir (-b sets the target; no sudo needed)
curl -sSfL https://get.anchore.io/syft | sh -s -- -b "$HOME/.local/bin"
Other paths (consult sf-gh): Scoop, Chocolatey, Nix.
Step 2 - Basic SBOM generation
Per sf-gh:
# Container image
syft alpine:latest
# Local directory
syft ./my-project
# Specific output format to stdout
syft <image> -o cyclonedx-json
# Multiple formats to files in one pass
syft <image> -o spdx-json=./spdx.json -o cyclonedx-json=./cdx.json
The default output is the table format (human-readable); use
explicit -o for machine-readable formats in CI.
Step 3 - Output format catalog
Per sf-gh, the common formats are cyclonedx-json (CycloneDX 1.5+,
broad support), spdx-json (SPDX 2.3, preferred by US federal procurement),
and syft-json (richest metadata). For Grype scan input (Step 7) use
syft-json or cyclonedx-json; for compliance delivery the consumer
dictates (SPDX-JSON US federal, CycloneDX-JSON most EU) - see sbom-formats
for the format-choice guidance. The full format catalog is in
references/formats.md.
Step 4 - Source types
Per sf-gh, the common sources are a local Docker image
(syft alpine:latest), a remote registry
(syft registry:docker.io/alpine:latest), an archive
(syft oci-archive:./image.tar), and a directory (syft dir:./my-project).
The full source-type syntax table is in
references/formats.md.
Step 5 - Attestation pattern (cosign)
For supply-chain integrity, attach the SBOM to the container image
via Sigstore cosign:
# Generate SBOM
syft my-image:1.0 -o cyclonedx-json=sbom.json
# Sign + attach to image (Sigstore)
cosign attest --predicate sbom.json --type cyclonedx my-image:1.0
# Verify
cosign verify-attestation --type cyclonedx my-image:1.0
The attestation lives alongside the image in the registry; downstream
consumers can verify provenance + retrieve the SBOM.
Step 6 - False-positive triage analogue
Syft generates inventories, not findings - there's no FP triage
per se. The analogue here is inventory accuracy: ensuring
Syft correctly identifies all components.
| Mechanism | Use |
|---|
--exclude=PATH_PATTERN | Skip directories from scan (vendor / generated) |
--catalogers=CATALOGER | Restrict to specific catalogers (e.g., npm, python) |
--source-name=NAME / --source-version=VERSION | Override SBOM-level metadata |
--platform=linux/amd64 | Target specific platform for multi-arch images |
Inventory accuracy validation:
# Compare two SBOMs (e.g., before vs after a build change)
syft image:1.0 -o syft-json=v1-sbom.json
syft image:1.1 -o syft-json=v1.1-sbom.json
diff <(jq -S . v1-sbom.json) <(jq -S . v1.1-sbom.json)
If Syft misses a component (false negative on inventory), the
downstream vuln scan misses any CVEs against that component.
Periodic accuracy validation against known dependencies catches
this.
Step 7 - Generate + scan workflow (Grype)
Grype is the Anchore vuln scanner that pairs with Syft. Per
github.com/anchore/grype, three input modes:
| Input mode | Use |
|---|
| Container image | grype alpine:latest (Grype generates SBOM internally) |
| Directory | grype ./my-project (filesystem scan) |
| SBOM input | grype sbom:./sbom.json (no re-generation; faster + auditable) |
The SBOM-input mode is the recommended production pattern: generate the
SBOM once via Syft (Step 2), attest via cosign (Step 5), then scan the
SBOM. Decoupling gives an audit trail and allows re-scanning with a
refreshed vuln DB without re-building. Per gr-gh, coverage spans
major OS package ecosystems (Alpine, Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL, Amazon Linux)
and language packages (Ruby, Java, JavaScript, Python, .NET, Go, PHP,
Rust).
# Install (Homebrew, or the install script into a user-owned dir - no sudo)
brew install grype
# curl -sSfL https://get.anchore.io/grype | sh -s -- -b "$HOME/.local/bin"
# Scan the Syft-generated SBOM (recommended)
grype sbom:./sbom.json
# Output formats: table (default) / json / sarif / cyclonedx-json / template
grype sbom:./sbom.json -o sarif # GitHub Code Scanning
grype sbom:./sbom.json -o json # EPSS + KEV + risk-score annotations
# CI gate: exit 1 at/above severity; focus on upgradable findings
grype sbom:./sbom.json --fail-on high --only-fixed
Severity levels per gr-gh: critical, high, medium, low,
negligible, unknown. The JSON output annotates findings with EPSS, KEV,
and risk scoring for downstream prioritization.
Suppression (MANDATORY triage): Grype's native path is .grype.yaml
ignore rules - per-CVE, per-package+version, or pattern-based
(fix-state), each with a mandatory expires: date and a reachability
reason:. Full config + justification template:
references/grype-ignore-rules.md.
OpenVEX status assertions (not_affected / fixed / etc., see
vex-author) filter findings in a signed, machine-readable way. Audit
ignore entries quarterly; expired entries are removed.
DB management for CI determinism - Grype's DB updates multiple times
per day; pin per scan or results vary run to run:
grype db update # manual refresh
grype db status
grype db import grype-db-v6-2026-05-06.tar.gz # pinned version for CI
CI wiring - anchore/scan-action wraps Grype + SARIF upload:
- uses: anchore/scan-action@v5
with:
sbom: sbom.cyclonedx.json
fail-build: true
severity-cutoff: high
output-format: sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with: { sarif_file: results.sarif }
Grype's DB is Anchore-curated; coverage differs from OSV.dev / Snyk / NVD -
pair with osv-scanner or snyk-test for consensus. No
reachability analysis: every CVE on a declared component counts.
Step 8 - Diffing SBOMs across versions
An SBOM diff turns two point-in-time inventories into a change signal:
which components are net-new, removed, or version-changed between image or
build versions. Per github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-cli, the
CycloneDX CLI provides a first-class diff subcommand accepting any two
CycloneDX BOMs (XML, JSON, or Protobuf):
# Install: brew install cyclonedx/cyclonedx/cyclonedx-cli
# or: docker run cyclonedx/cyclonedx-cli ...
# Generate both inventories with the SAME source type + format
syft myapp:1.0 -o cyclonedx-json=sbom-v1.0.json
syft myapp:1.1 -o cyclonedx-json=sbom-v1.1.json
# Human-readable diff
cyclonedx diff sbom-v1.0.json sbom-v1.1.json --component-versions
# Machine-readable diff for CI gate logic
cyclonedx diff sbom-v1.0.json sbom-v1.1.json \
--component-versions --output-format json > diff-result.json
Key flags per cdx-cli-gh: --component-versions (the signal
flag - reports added / removed / version-changed components; without it
only structural BOM changes are reported), --from-format / --to-format
(autodetect / json / xml / protobuf), --output-format
(text / json).
The JSON output carries three lists: added (net-new deps - review
every entry: expected transitive dep, base-image update, or supply-chain
risk), removed (may hide a dep renamed by a packaging change), and
modified (version changes with old + new values). Minimal CI gate:
ADDED=$(jq '.added | length' diff-result.json)
if [ "$ADDED" -gt "0" ]; then
echo "::error::Net-new components detected. Review diff-result.json."
jq '.added' diff-result.json
exit 1
fi
The full GitHub Actions gate with allowlist-subtraction, plus the
nightly-drift workflow (diff production tag vs last known-good SBOM,
rotate the baseline only on a clean diff), are in
references/diff-ci-workflows.md.
Diff rules of thumb: always pass --component-versions; generate both
SBOMs with the same tool, format, and source type (dir: vs image scope
mismatch produces noisy diffs); diff multi-arch images per-platform
(--platform=linux/amd64 on both runs); SPDX SBOMs need
cyclonedx convert first. The diff shows inventory change, not
vulnerability change - scan net-new components with Grype (Step 7).
Step 9 - CI integration
jobs:
sbom:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0
with:
path: ./
format: cyclonedx-json
output-file: sbom.cyclonedx.json
- uses: anchore/sbom-action@v0
with:
path: ./
format: spdx-json
output-file: sbom.spdx.json
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: sboms
path: sbom.*.json
The anchore/sbom-action GHA wraps Syft + handles GitHub
dependency-graph submission automatically when format: github-json.
Step 10 - Composition with sister tools
| Sister tool | Use |
|---|
sbom-formats | Reference for CycloneDX + SPDX schemas and format choice |
trivy-image | Alternative scanner (built-in SBOM gen + scan in one pass) |
vex-author | OpenVEX documents that filter Grype findings (Step 7) |
osv-scanner | Cross-plugin: also accepts SBOM input |
Anti-patterns
| Anti-pattern | Why it fails | Fix |
|---|
| Generate SBOM only at release time | Misses build-time inventory differences | Generate per CI build + attest |
| Use single format only | Different consumers need different formats | Generate both CycloneDX + SPDX (Step 2) |
| Skip platform targeting on multi-arch images | Misses platform-specific deps | --platform=linux/amd64 (Step 6) |
| Generate SBOM but don't attest / sign | Provenance unverifiable downstream | Cosign attest pattern (Step 5) |
| Trust Syft inventory without validation | Misses components → misses CVEs | Periodic accuracy check (Step 6) |
| Re-generate SBOM via Grype on every scan | Slow + non-deterministic; SBOM lives outside scan | Use sbom: input mode (Step 7) |
.grype.yaml ignore without expires: | Permanent debt | Mandatory expires: (Step 7) |
| Skip Grype DB pin in CI | Different DB version per run; non-deterministic | Pin DB version (Step 7) |
Diff without --component-versions | Reports only structural BOM changes, not inventory delta | Always pass the flag (Step 8) |
| Diff SBOMs from different tools / scan depths | Format + scope mismatches appear as false diffs | Same generator, format, source type (Step 8) |
Limitations
- Syft can't scan what it can't see - encrypted archives, custom
package formats may produce incomplete SBOMs.
- Some language-specific catalogers have edge cases (e.g., npm
workspaces, Python wheel quirks); validate against known deps.
- SBOM generation alone doesn't prove the deps are vulnerability-free -
run the Grype scan step (Step 7).
- Multi-arch container scanning is per-platform; combine SBOMs
manually or via tooling for unified view.
- Grype includes no reachability analysis, and its DB coverage differs
from OSV.dev / Snyk / NVD (Step 7).
cyclonedx diff operates on CycloneDX only; SPDX SBOMs require
cyclonedx convert first (Step 8).
References
- sf-gh - Syft repository: install, scan commands, formats
- gr-gh - Grype repository: install, input modes,
--fail-on
- cdx-cli-gh - cyclonedx-cli repository: diff flags + output
- references/formats.md - full output format catalog + source-type syntax
- references/grype-ignore-rules.md -
.grype.yaml config + justification template
- references/diff-ci-workflows.md - diff CI gate + nightly drift workflows
- anchore.com/syft - landing
- oss.anchore.com/docs/reference/grype/cli/ - full Grype CLI reference
- openvex.dev - OpenVEX specification; first.org/epss - EPSS data source
- ntia.gov/SBOM - NTIA SBOM minimum elements
- whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-improving-the-nations-cybersecurity/ - US EO 14028
sbom-formats,
trivy-image,
vex-author - sister tools