Audit the extensions AI coding agents load and trust (skills, plugins, marketplaces, hooks, settings, MCP servers, and instruction files like CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursor/rules and copilot-instructions.md) across Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI and GitHub Copilot. Read-only: inventories each item with its source and pin, greps for hidden instructions, exfiltration, credential reads, persistence, curl|bash and over-broad tool grants, reviews hooks and MCP pinning and tool poisoning, and gives each item a SAFE / CAUTION / DO-NOT-INSTALL verdict. Use when the user mentions 'audit my skills,' 'is this skill malicious,' 'is this skill safe,' 'is this MCP server safe,' 'review CLAUDE.md,' 'review AGENTS.md,' 'plugin security,' 'check my hooks,' 'audit my MCP servers,' 'agent supply chain,' 'SkillSpector,' 'tool poisoning,' 'rug pull,' or is about to install a skill, plugin, or MCP server.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills☆ 4732026年10月28日 更新
Apply the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0) and adjacent guidance to AI / ML systems — model lifecycle governance, fairness and bias evaluation, robustness, transparency, accountability, third-party model risk, monitoring for drift, and AI incident response. Broader than prompt-injection (which is the security slice). Use when the user mentions 'AI risk,' 'AI governance,' 'NIST AI RMF,' 'AI compliance,' 'ML governance,' 'model risk management,' 'AI fairness,' 'AI bias,' 'algorithmic accountability,' 'AI Bill of Rights,' 'EU AI Act,' 'AI transparency,' 'model card,' 'AI red-team program,' 'AI safety,' 'responsible AI,' 'model drift,' 'concept drift,' 'AI monitoring,' 'AI incident,' or needs to assess or govern an AI / ML system.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills☆ 4732026年10月28日 更新
Audit REST, GraphQL, and RPC APIs against the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023). Use when the user mentions 'API security,' 'API audit,' 'BOLA,' 'broken object level authorization,' 'BFLA,' 'function-level authorization,' 'mass assignment,' 'API rate limiting,' 'GraphQL security,' 'REST security,' 'API authentication,' 'API authorization,' 'excessive data exposure,' or needs to review API endpoints for security weaknesses.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills☆ 4732026年10月28日 更新
Learn from public breach disclosures — extract the audit question each one implies and check your own stack. Capital One IMDS abuse, LastPass vault exfiltration, Okta Lapsus$, Snowflake credential reuse, MOVEit, SolarWinds, Equifax, Target POS, Codecov, Uber, Twilio — what would you check now if your boss said 'could that happen to us?' Use when the user mentions 'breach analysis,' 'lessons learned,' 'security postmortem,' 'breach patterns,' 'breach lessons,' 'has this happened to us,' 'apply breach lessons,' 'preempt breaches,' 'security retrospective,' 'real-world security incidents,' or wants to harden against known attacker playbooks.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills☆ 4732026年10月28日 更新
Test an authorized web application for business-logic flaws and race conditions — the classes scanners cannot find. Model invariants (conservation of value, uniqueness, monotonicity, exclusivity), build an Actor x Action x Resource matrix, abuse state machines (skip/reorder/replay steps, limit-slicing), find numeric bugs (float-vs-decimal rounding, cross-currency refund arbitrage, negative amounts), stale feature gates, and saga gaps; prove concurrency bugs (double-spend, lost update, idempotency-key reuse) with controlled parallel requests. Use when the user mentions 'business logic testing,' 'race condition,' 'double spend,' 'TOCTOU,' 'concurrency bug,' 'idempotency,' 'coupon reuse,' 'workflow bypass,' 'limit bypass,' 'negative amount,' 'refund arbitrage,' 'parallel request attack,' or 'logic flaw.'
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills☆ 4732026年10月28日 更新
Audit CI/CD pipelines, GitHub Actions first and GitLab CI and CircleCI briefly, for the paths that give an outsider code execution, secrets or a write token: pull_request_target and workflow_run running untrusted code, expression injection into run steps, missing or broad workflow permissions, third-party actions not pinned to a commit SHA, OIDC trust policies with wildcard subjects, self-hosted runners on public repos, secrets reaching forks, cache and artifact trust between workflows, and AI agents in CI that read issue or PR text while holding a write token. Runs zizmor and actionlint read-only and writes findings.json. Use when the user mentions 'pull_request_target,' 'pwn request,' 'workflow injection,' 'zizmor,' 'actionlint,' 'pin actions to SHA,' 'GITHUB_TOKEN permissions,' 'self-hosted runner,' 'claude-code-action,' 'AI agent in CI,' 'GitLab CI security,' 'CircleCI security,' 'is this workflow safe,' or needs to secure a build pipeline.
日本語の概要は準備中です。原文の説明を表示しています。
briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills☆ 4732026年10月28日 更新