Risk limits and sizing
The user sets the desk's limits, in writing, once; the Risk Manager enforces them on every ticket using live data. Hyperliquid's own constraints (max leverage per market, margin tiers, size decimals, minimum order value) always apply on top.
0. Desk ceilings
The desk holds a few ceilings of its own. They are not risk advice and they are deliberately far looser than any sane discretionary setting: they exist so that a mistyped, corrupted or over-eager limits file cannot authorise a catastrophic ticket on an unattended desk.
| Ceiling | Value |
|---|
| max risk per trade | 2% of equity |
| max total open risk | 6% of equity |
| max leverage on any market | 20x, and never above the exchange or tier max |
| daily loss stop | -10% of start-of-day equity |
| exchange-resting stop on every entry | mandatory |
| standing approval for a mainnet send that can open or increase exposure | never |
The one send a standing approval may cover on any network is reduce-only protection: placing or resizing a stop for a position that has none. It can only ever reduce exposure, and the alternative is an unprotected position waiting on a human. Entries, adds, leverage increases and anything that can open or grow a position always need approval by id, on every network.
The user's limits file may only be stricter than these. A file that sets a value looser than a ceiling is not applied: the Risk Manager REJECTs with gate failed: limits file exceeds desk ceiling <name>, keeps enforcing the ceiling, and asks the user to edit the file. The desk never edits the file itself, and no Bot may raise a ceiling.
1. Write the limits file (setup, or on change)
Interview the user, one question at a time, then write /workspace/trading-desk/risk-limits.md. Version it (v1, v2...) and date every change. Only the user changes it, in chat; the Risk Manager records who, when and why.
# Risk limits v1 - 2026-08-16 - set by user
- network: testnet # testnet | mainnet
- account: 0xabc...def # the account the API wallet acts for
- equity basis: accountValue from clearinghouseState (cross margin summary), read live
- max risk per trade: 0.5% of equity # loss if the stop is hit
- max total open risk: 2% of equity # positions plus reserved risk for pending entries
- max leverage per market: 3x # never above the exchange max, and never above this
- max positions: 3
- allowed markets: BTC, ETH, SOL, HYPE # perps; spot needs an explicit entry
- stops: mandatory on every entry, on the exchange, not "mental"
- daily loss stop: -2% of start-of-day equity -> no new risk until the user resets in writing
- max slippage tolerance at send: 10 bps # Execution Trader stops if mid moved further
- correlated cluster limit: majors (BTC, ETH, SOL) count as one cluster; max 2 positions per cluster
- standing approvals: none # recommended: protective stops (reduce-only), any network
- unprotected position deadline: 15m # then tell the user to fix it in the Hyperliquid app
- notes:
Sensible starting points for someone new to perps: 0.25-0.5% per trade, 3x or lower, testnet first. Do not argue the user up or down; record what they choose and enforce it, within the ceilings in section 0.
2. Size a trade
Inputs you need before you start: entry price, stop price, side, market, the current limits file, and live state. If any input is missing or stale, REJECT with "missing input", do not guess.
2.1 Read live state (never from memory)
- Account:
clearinghouseState for equity (marginSummary.accountValue), free margin (accountValue - totalMarginUsed), positions (assetPositions[].position: coin, szi, entryPx, leverage, liquidationPx, marginUsed, unrealizedPnl) and open orders via openOrders / frontendOpenOrders; and activeAssetData for the market, whose availableToTrade (buy, sell) and maxTradeSzs are the exchange's own figures for what can be opened at the account's current leverage setting. Skill: hyperliquid-account.
- Market:
meta for the asset's szDecimals, maxLeverage and its margin table; metaAndAssetCtxs for mark and mid; l2Book depth from the Market Analyst's evidence. Skill: hyperliquid-market-data.
- Day PnL: start-of-day equity from the journal or
portfolio, current equity now.
Read userAbstraction before choosing the equity and margin basis. Use the account-mode rules in hyperliquid-account; adding spot USDC to a perp summary can count the same collateral twice. An unsupported or unclear basis is missing input, not permission to use whichever balance is larger.
Record each request's account, network, exchange time where supplied, and local request/receipt times. These reads are separate responses, not an atomic account snapshot. If fills or order changes arrive between them, refresh the affected reads before a PASS; stale, future-dated or conflicting state cannot establish capacity.
2.2 Arithmetic (show every line in the PASS)
risk_usd = equity x max_risk_pct
stop_distance = |entry - stop| (must be > 0)
slip_stop = assumed slippage on a triggered stop, in price units
(at least the market's current spread; widen it on thin l2Book depth for this size)
stop_fill = stop - slip_stop (long) | stop + slip_stop (short)
taker_fee = the account's taker rate from `userFees` (a stop is a market exit; it pays taker)
fees_per_unit = (entry + stop_fill) x taker_fee (entry leg and exit leg)
stressed_distance = |entry - stop_fill| + fees_per_unit
raw_size = risk_usd / stressed_distance (never risk_usd / stop_distance)
size = round_down(raw_size, szDecimals) (never round up)
notional = size x entry
check notional >= 10 USD (Hyperliquid minimum order value)
check size >= 1 lot at szDecimals (else REJECT: risk budget too small for this stop)
tier = margin tier for existing + pending entry + candidate notional
max_lev_here = min(ceiling 20x, limits.max_leverage, tier max leverage)
margin_needed = notional / requested_leverage (requested_leverage <= max_lev_here)
check margin_needed + pending_margin <= free_margin x 0.8
(20% headroom; tighter if the user says so)
open_risk_after = sum(stressed risk of open positions) + pending_risk + risk_usd
check open_risk_after <= equity x max_total_open_risk
check open_risk_after <= equity x 6% (desk ceiling, section 0)
check risk_usd <= equity x 2% (desk ceiling, section 0)
check positions_after <= max_positions ; cluster count within cluster limit
check market in allowed list ; stop present ; daily loss stop not hit
R for the ticket is stop_distance in USD per unit, and targets are quoted in R by the user, never invented by the desk. Size, though, comes from stressed_distance, so the ticket carries both and says which did what.
Why the stress. A stop is a trigger order: when it fires it becomes a market or IOC order and fills at whatever is there, which is worse than the trigger price and worse still on thin depth, in a gap, or in a liquidation cascade. Both legs also pay fees. Sizing from the nominal stop_distance therefore prices a loss that cannot happen and quietly overshoots max_risk_pct on every trade. Size from the stressed distance and the budget means what it says. slip_stop is an assumption: state the number used and where it came from in the PASS, and widen it rather than narrow it when the depth read is stale or the size is large relative to the book.
Worked, on the numbers from agents/risk-manager.md: equity $10,200, 0.5% budget, ETH long at 3,000 with the stop at 2,900, 3.00 of slippage on the triggered stop (10 bps of the 3,000 ticket price, the desk's convention in desk-trade-lifecycle) and 0.045% taker on both legs. Stressed distance is 105.65, not 100, so the size is 0.4827 ETH rather than 0.51, and the worst case comes to exactly the $51.00 budgeted. Sized the naive way at 0.51 ETH, the same stop costs $53.88, which is 0.528% of equity: the budget was 0.5% and the desk quietly spent more, on every trade, in the same direction.
The stress is a sizing input, not a promise. A gap through the stop can still exceed it; that is the residual the user carries, and the daily loss stop is what bounds it.
Reserve capacity before the fill. pending_risk and pending_margin cover other live ticket reservations, resting entry remainders, and sends whose outcomes are unknown, across this account and network. The Risk Manager allocates capacity in order and records the ticket revision, reserved risk and margin under ## risk before issuing a PASS; the next ticket includes that reservation. Do not let two parallel proposals each spend the same free capacity. Exclude this candidate's own reservation from the pending_* sums, then include its risk and margin once in the checks above.
For a confirmed partial fill, count the filled portion in positions and keep the unfilled portion reserved; an $80 reservation split into $30 filled risk and $50 pending risk still consumes $80. For an unknown result keep the full reservation until reconciliation establishes the split. Any unidentifiable open entry, missing stop assumption or incomplete history blocks new risk rather than receiving a zero estimate. Count markets and correlated clusters after all pending entries could fill, and include their notional when selecting margin tiers. Reduce-only exits do not create new capacity until their fills are reconciled.
A never-sent ticket releases its reservation when explicitly voided or expired. A dispatched ticket does not release on ticket expiry, a cancel request, a missing WebSocket update, an empty openOrders read or elapsed time. Establish the remaining order's terminal state (or the original send's proven expiry per desk-execution-protocol), reconcile fills and resulting positions, then release only the unused capacity. Keep a conservative reservation when the evidence is incomplete. Compare the result with fresh activeAssetData capacity as well; an exchange figure is an additional constraint, not a replacement for the desk's risk limit. Avoid deducting an exchange hold twice only when its coverage is demonstrated.
Example: equity $10,000 and a 2% total-risk limit allow $200. Positions risk $40 and a resting entry reserves $80; another $100 ticket would consume $220 and is REJECTed even though the resting order has not filled.
2.3 Margin tiers matter
Max leverage on Hyperliquid is per market and tiered by position notional: the headline max applies only up to the first tier's notional; larger positions get lower max leverage. Read the market's margin table from meta (marginTables, matched via the asset's marginTableId) and use the tier that the post-trade notional lands in. A size that fits at the headline leverage may not fit at the tier it actually lands in. Say which tier applied.
For isolated-margin positions the position's own margin, not account free margin, is what stands between the position and liquidation; check liquidationPx after the fact when the position exists.
2.4 Output
PASS: the block in agents/risk-manager.md (inputs, sizing, leverage and tier, book after, gates, exact ticket fields, next owner). REJECT: same header, gate failed: <one gate, the numbers>. Write it under ## risk in the proposal file and post it on the floor.
3. Book check ("how's the book")
From clearinghouseState, openOrders/frontendOpenOrders, metaAndAssetCtxs:
- equity, free margin,
crossMaintenanceMarginUsed, margin ratio (crossMaintenanceMarginUsed / crossMarginSummary.accountValue), and the distance from mark to liquidationPx per position in percent
- positions: coin, side, size, entry, mark, unrealised PnL, leverage and mode, margin used
- open risk to stop per position, pending risk and margin by ticket, and the combined risk versus limits
- protection: for each position, is there a reduce-only stop resting on the exchange (trigger order,
reduceOnly: true, correct side, and either size at least the position size or a position-tied stop with sz: 0.0 and isPositionTpsl: true, which closes the whole position)? If not: unprotected, flagged as an incident to the Desk Lead
- open orders that no longer belong to a position (orphans)
- day PnL versus the daily loss stop
- funding paid so far today from
userFunding when relevant
Timestamp everything. Save a copy under /workspace/trading-desk/briefs/YYYY-MM-DD-book.md when the user asks for a written check.
4. When the desk hits a limit
- Daily loss stop hit: post it once on the floor, set
status: no-new-risk in desk.md, and REJECT new proposals with that gate until the user resets in writing. Exits and protection are still allowed.
- Unprotected position discovered: alert the Desk Lead and Execution Trader immediately; a protective stop ticket goes through the lifecycle at priority. If the user pre-authorised protective stops, it goes straight out under that standing approval. If not, the alert carries the exposure and the distance to liquidation, and once the deadline in
desk.md passes the desk tells the user to close or protect the position in the Hyperliquid app themselves (desk-incident-response playbook D).
- Limits file missing or unversioned: the desk is a research desk until it exists.
Pitfalls
- Sizing from a desired profit or from "what the margin allows" instead of from the stop. The stop defines the size.
- Sizing off the nominal stop distance as if a triggered stop fills at its trigger price. It does not. Use
stressed_distance.
- Reading a failed, empty or stale account call as a clean book. A read that did not arrive is unavailable, not "no positions" and not "no open risk": REJECT with
missing input and never size against remembered numbers.
- Using account leverage or headline max leverage instead of the tier that applies.
- Counting correlated positions as independent.
- Treating a plan file, a chat message or a screenshot as an open order. Only the exchange record is.
- Rounding size up to reach the minimum notional. If the minimum notional implies more risk than the budget, that is a REJECT.