Security Reference

Security Model Details

Authentication, Bridge defense, IDOR prevention, secret management, IAM roles:

• architecture.md §7 — Bridge defense, authentication, IDOR, secrets, IAM

Security Checklist (For Code Writing/Review)

Bridge Server

• Bearer token authentication applied to all endpoints except /health
• TLS (self-signed) applied (https.createServer)
• Gateway bound to --bind localhost to block external access
• Running as non-root user (USER openclaw)
• /health returns only { "status": "ok" } (no internal info exposure)

Secrets

• API keys/tokens NOT written to openclaw.json
• Using config.auth = { method: "env" }
• delete config.auth?.apiKey applied
• delete config.gateway?.auth?.token applied
• Delivered only via Secrets Manager → environment variables

IDOR

• userId determined server-side (JWT sub or connectionId reverse lookup)
• Client-provided userId not trusted
• DynamoDB query PK uses jwt.sub

Authentication

• WebSocket: ?token={jwt} → verified in ws-connect
• REST API: Cognito User Pool Authorizer applied
• Telegram: X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token verification + pairing check

IAM

• Lambda: access only to required DynamoDB tables (resource ARN restricted)
• Fargate: access only to S3 data bucket
• ECS permissions: Condition restricted to specific cluster
• PassRole: only task-role and exec-role allowed

Lambda Agent (Phase 2)

See architecture.md §security for full Lambda security details.

• Lambda IAM least privilege: S3:GetObject/PutObject on sessions/* prefix only
• Lambda IAM: SSM:GetParameter on secrets/* prefix only (no wildcard)
• Lambda IAM: DynamoDB:GetItem/PutItem/DeleteItem on TaskState table only
• Lambda IAM: cloudwatch:PutMetricData for custom metrics (namespace-restricted)
• SessionLock prevents concurrent Lambda invocations accessing same session
• No secrets on disk: HOME=/tmp, env vars only (never write API keys to files)
• Lambda container: non-root user, read-only root filesystem where possible